Through the Years:The Supreme Court and the Copyright Clause by Okediji, Ruth L.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 30 | Issue 5 Article 5
2004
Through the Years:The Supreme Court and the
Copyright Clause
Ruth L. Okediji
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Okediji, Ruth L. (2004) "Through the Years:The Supreme Court and the Copyright Clause," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 30: Iss.
5, Article 5.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss5/5
OKEDIJI-FORMATTED.DOC 8/10/2004 6:37:45 PM 
 
1633 
THROUGH THE YEARS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE 
Ruth L. Okediji† 
 I. COMPETENCY AND ORIGINALISM ......................................... 1637 
 II. SHIFTING BOUNDARIES: CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER 
THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE AND THE TREATY POWER............. 1649 
 III. MORE THAN A JURISPRUDENCE OF DEFERENCE? ................. 1653 
 IV. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 1656 
 
The Supreme Court’s role in developing copyright law recently 
has assumed a significance traditionally reserved for issues of 
“high” constitutional import.  The extension of copyright-type 
protection to new technologies and new information products,1 the 
increasing criminalization of copyright violations,2 and the 
implications of copyright term extension for the First Amendment3 
 
 †    William L. Prosser Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.  I 
am grateful to Ken Port and Niels Schaumann for inviting me to participate in the 
Conference on the Impact of the Supreme Court on Intellectual Property Law 
This Millennium, held at William Mitchell College of Law, April 24, 2004.  Thanks 
to Jim Chen and David McGowan for comments on an earlier draft, Michael 
Stokes Paulsen for a long, helpful conversation about constitutional 
interpretation, and Tomas Felcman and Eugene Sherayzen for valuable research 
assistance. 
 1. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 
DMCA]; Database and Collections of Information Misappropriations Act, H.R. 
3261, 108th Cong. (2003)), available at http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited July 20, 
2004). 
 2. See, e.g., No Electronic Theft Act, 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2) (2000) (imposing 
criminal liability on individual infringers without regard to profit motives); DMCA, 
17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2003) (imposing criminal liability for violation of the anti-
trafficking provision of the anti-circumvention prohibition); Lydia Loren, 
Digitalization, Commodification, and Criminalization: The Evolution of Criminal 
Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement, 77 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 835, 840 (1999). 
 3. Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints 
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Mark A. Lemley & 
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 
DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Neil W. Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment 
Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) 
1
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and the public domain expose a complex and enduring mêlée over 
the function of copyright in the digital age and a corresponding 
concern about the scope of Congress’s power pursuant to the 
Copyright Clause.4  With little historical documentation on the 
Clause, but growing scholarly interest,5 Congress’s power over 
intellectual property policy has not been subject to the level of 
judicial or academic scrutiny usually attendant to matters of 
constitutional application. In recent years, however, the legislative 
expansion of copyright and the ubiquitousness of copyrighted 
works, both to a large degree occasioned by digital networks, have 
intensified the relationship between copyright and the First 
Amendment while highlighting the less-explored relationships 
between copyright and the Commerce Clause, the Treaty Power, 
and other subjects of constitutional significance.  The explicit 
application of constitutional law analysis to copyright policy has 
taken place almost exclusively within the context of First 
Amendment considerations in efforts to determine limits on 
copyright and, by extension, limits on Congress’s power to expand 
copyright protection.6  The relationship of copyright to social and 
economic welfare—matters that resonate less powerfully in wealthy 
economies, but that appeal strongly to salient moments in the 
chronicles of United States constitutional jurisprudence7—has 
 
(rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the Copyright Term Extension Act); 
David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 281 (2004) (rejecting the proposition that the First Amendment provides 
any rational basis for limiting copyright). 
 4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  Commentators use different names for this 
constitutional provision, such as the Intellectual Property Clause, the Patent and 
Copyright Clause, the Patent Clause, and the Copyright Clause.  I will use the title 
“Copyright Clause” throughout this article. 
 5. See, e.g., Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope 
of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45 (2000); L. Ray Patterson, 
Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 365 (2000); Malla Pollack, 
What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 
of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754 
(2001). 
 6. Again, the bulk of this work has focused on the relationship between 
copyright and the First Amendment.  See C. Edwin Baker, Essay, First Amendment 
Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891 (2002); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of 
Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002). 
 7. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); United States v. 
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 
(1954) (identifying education as “perhaps the most important function” of state 
and local governments).  Historically, the role of copyright in promoting 
education has been a weighty aspect of the public welfare element of copyright 
regulation.  Starting from the first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, copyright 
2
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largely been reserved to scholars dealing with the effect of strong 
proprietary regimes on economic development in the developing 
world.  The current environment in the United States has provided 
a valuable opportunity to consider how copyright policy affects 
matters of broad socio-economic and political concern in 
developed countries as well. 
The three cases of the new millennium deal with different 
aspects of copyright regulation—indeed, one only indirectly with 
copyright at all.8  In New York Times Co. v. Tasini,9 the Court 
considered the copyright interests of freelance authors whose 
articles had been published without their authorization in an 
electronic database by the New York Times.  Section 201(c) of the 
Copyright Act grants the owner of copyright in a collective work the 
privilege only of “reproducing and distributing the contribution as 
part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective 
work, and any later collective work in the same series.”10  The 
question before the Court was whether the electronic publication 
of a periodical in a database that offered users individual articles 
isolated from the periodical as a whole was a proper exercise of the 
§ 201(c) publisher’s privilege.  The Court, in a 7-2 decision, opined 
that the transfer of articles to a database was not similar to the 
conversion from newsprint to microfiche, and held that databases 
that  store and retrieve articles separately “effectively override[] the 
Author’s exclusive right to control the individual reproduction and 
distribution of each Article . . . .”11  The majority held fast to a 
literal reading of the statutory text and disagreed with the 
dissenting Justices that “revision” in the context of digital media 
should mean something different than in print media. 
In Eldred v. Ashcroft,12 the Court addressed a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 
 
has been an engine to encourage “learning.”  See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, 
ch. 19 (“An act for the encouragement of learning”). This focus was reflected in 
various state copyright statutes.  See,  e.g., Rhode Island 1783 Copyright Act (citing 
as one purpose “the improvement of knowledge”); LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, 
COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 186 (1968) (stating that the preambles to 
early state copyright statutes provided that “the reason for [copyright] was to 
encourage authors to produce and thus to improve learning”). 
 8. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
 9. New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
 10. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (c) (2000). 
 11. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 503-04 (2001). 
 12. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
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(CTEA),13 which extended copyright protection for existing and 
future works by twenty years.  The petitioner argued principally 
that the CTEA fails to satisfy the constitutional mandate to promote 
the progress of science and the useful arts, and violates the “limited 
times” provision of the Copyright Clause, as well as the First 
Amendment.  Eldred thus presented the Court with a direct 
opportunity to determine the constraints imposed by the Clause on 
Congress’s power to regulate copyright. 
Finally, in Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox,14 the petitioner  
released a video set it called “World War II Campaigns in Europe” 
made from tapes of an original television series first produced by 
Fox, but that were in the public domain.  Dastar edited the series 
and marketed the video sets as its own product.  Fox and its 
licensees brought an action under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 
which proscribes false designations of origin, false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact 
likely to cause confusion as to the origin of the goods.15  The Court 
held that § 43(a) does not provide a cause of action against a 
person who uses a public domain work without attribution to the 
author.  The decision affirmed a vision of the public domain as a 
resource for completely unconditional access to, and use of, 
expired copyrighted works.16 
These three cases of the new millennium provide an 
opportunity to consider copyright law in a broader constitutional 
context, and to examine the role of the Supreme Court in the 
development of copyright policy in a global digital environment.  
Focusing principally on the Eldred case, I  discuss why the Court 
(and the judiciary in general), whose vigilance in the nineteenth 
century gave us the legacy of the public domain, would now 
seemingly retreat from active oversight of legislation that, in the 
view of many,17 redefines the copyright bargain between authors 
 
 13. Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102 (b), (d), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827-28 (1998). 
 14. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000). 
 16. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34 (acknowledging the “public’s right” to copy and use 
works in which copyright has expired). 
 17. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 29, 54 (1994) (criticizing balance of rights between copyright owners and 
public); Ted Bunker, Copyright Idea Emerges, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20, 2003, at 23 (“If 
Congress isn’t entirely in the grip of Hollywood and the big media  interests served 
by the 1998 extension, it’s tough to see the evidence”); Adam Cohen, Book 
Review, The Intellectual Imperialists, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2004, at 12 (criticizing power 
of copyright holders to restrict public use of various works); Robert S. Boynton,  
4
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and the public to the detriment of the latter.  I conclude that the 
Supreme Court has ostensibly remained stable in its treatment of 
the Copyright Clause. The Court’s adherence to a strict textualist 
approach to statutes enacted pursuant to the Copyright Clause is 
reconcilable with the literalism that dominated nineteenth century 
copyright cases. Such textualism, and the deference to Congress 
that it begets, is also fairly consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence 
in matters of economic regulation. However, the nineteenth 
century cases reflected concerns about the nature of copyright that 
are no longer salient today.  Thus, I argue that the Court’s modern 
textualism actually serves to undercut the significant normative 
principles that counseled literalism as the most faithful means for 
achieving the welfare goals of the Copyright Clause in the previous 
millennium. 
 
I. COMPETENCY AND ORIGINALISM 
The cautious conservativism of the Court in Eldred, Dastar, and 
Tasini is noteworthy, in my view, primarily for the tension between 
the Court’s insistence on literalism in its interpretation of the 
copyright statute, and its abandonment of any inquiry into the 
original intent behind the Copyright Clause. From a historical 
perspective, originalism and textualism must be balanced if the 
Court is to consider seriously the meaning and purpose of the 
Copyright Clause.18 By eliding substantive analysis of the social 
welfare effects of copyright and, instead, deferring to the 
institutional competency of Congress, the Court failed to engage in 
its most formidable and necessary task, namely, determining the 
appropriate scope of congressional powers consistent with the basic 
premise of the Copyright Clause.19  As one nineteenth century 
judge expressed it, “[u]ndoubtedly a large discretion is lodged in 
the Congress with respect to the subjects which could properly be 
included within the constitutional provision; but that discretion is 
not unlimited.  It is bounded and circumscribed by the lines of the 
 
The Tyranny of Copyright?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, at 40 (criticizing recent 
copyright laws as giving too much power to copyright holders). 
 18. But see Eldred, 537 U.S. at 260-61. 
 19. As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated recently, “[n]o doubt the political 
branches have a role in interpreting and applying the Constitution, but . . . this 
Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.”  United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 (2000). 
5
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general object sought to be accomplished.”20  The new 
jurisprudence of deference in copyright matters, “constrained by 
the language of statutes and the intent of Congress,”21 dispenses 
with the fundamental challenge of delineating institutional roles by 
treating as one and the same the constitutional objective and the 
means by which Congress chooses to exercise its authority.22 
As I will elaborate later, this is a notable difference between 
the nineteenth century cases and the modern cases leading up to 
Eldred.  The early courts took seriously the objectives of the 
Copyright Clause, often invoking those objectives as the premise 
for analysis of the legitimacy of the statute at issue.23  Professor 
Leaffer prefers a “pragmatic, instrumentalist”24 approach to 
constitutional interpretation as the best means of promoting social 
welfare, broadly defined in copyright parlance in terms of the 
balance between the interests of owners and users.25  In my view, 
constitutional jurisprudence “constrained by the language of 
statutes and intent of Congress”26 yields a circularity that obfuscates 
the central question whether a particular statute is a proper 
exercise of a constitutional power.  A statute should be evaluated in 
light of the scope of the underlying constitutional grant—a scope 
determined  by a specific interpretive approach that is itself 
informed by how the Court views its role in that particular subject 
area.  It seems clear that the current Court views copyright first and 
foremost as a piece of economic regulation, with built-in 
mechanisms to redress First Amendment concerns.27 But the 
Copyright Clause may also involve matters with less-explored 
constitutional implications, which only a constitutional vision of 
copyright can help elucidate.  For example, is it constitutional to 
grant stronger copyright protection to foreign copyright owners?28 
 
 20. J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow et al., 82 F. 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1897). 
 21. Marshall Leaffer, Life after Eldred: The Supreme Court and the Future of 
Copyright, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1597 (2004). 
 22. At heart, this is an issue that dates back to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137 (1803), and more generally, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 23. See infra pp. 1647-49. 
 24. Leaffer, supra note 21, at 1598. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218-19 (2003). 
 28. This is arguably what Congress did when it restored the works of foreign 
copyright owners pursuant to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 
6
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In what way does such restoration promote “progress” in the 
United States? Would a statute that extends copyright protection to 
oral literature or folklore in the United States violate the Copyright 
Clause? The fixation requirement of copyright law29 is generally 
regarded as consistent with the constitutional term “writings” in the 
Copyright Clause.  However, no international treaty requires 
fixation for obtaining copyright protection.30  If Congress decided 
to eliminate fixation to recognize the bounty of creative expression 
existing or generated by minority groups in the United States, 
whose cultural traditions are rooted in community identity and 
shared traditions passed down orally through generations, would 
such a statute be constitutional? Would it pass constitutional 
muster if Congress passed the statute pursuant to an international 
agreement? 
Failure to provide a grand constitutional vision of the 
Copyright Clause ignores the fact that copyright law, like other 
economic regulation, may operate in ways that privilege certain 
values, cultures, heritages, and types of expression over others, and 
that it does so in a way that undermines other constitutional ideals 
found in the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses.  Viewed 
strictly as a form of economic regulation, constitutional analysis of 
copyright legislation falls significantly short of addressing the deep 
cultural, political, social, and economic importance of copyright to 
this and succeeding generations.  This myopic vision of copyright 
also ignores the growing use of the Foreign Affairs Power to 
accomplish change in domestic copyright policy.31  Further, it 
leaves us with no meaningful criteria to evaluate whether a 
particular legislative outcome is properly informed by or infused 
 
U.N.T.S. 221 (Berne Convention), and failed to extend the same privilege to 
United States works. 
 29. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
 30. Berne Convention, supra note 28, art. 2 (2) (leaving a fixation 
requirement to the discretion of member countries).  Neither the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty nor the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) addresses fixation. 
 31. A recent opinion from the District of Columbia avoided the intersection 
between the Treaty Power and the Copyright Clause, and evaluated the 
constitutionality of the Uruguay Round implementing legislation under the latter. 
See Luck’s Music Library Inc. v. Ashcroft, Civ. Action No. 01-2220, 2004 WL 
1278070 (D.D.C. June 10, 2004), at 1, 8-9.  The court, applying Eldred, concluded 
that restoration of copyright in foreign works pursuant to Section 514 of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act “did not overstep Congress’ power under the 
[Copyright Clause].” Id. at 1. 
7
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with an identifiable constitutional value.  Finally, it diminishes the 
significance of the Court’s role in the development of modern 
copyright law and, specifically, the public domain. 
As epitomized by Eldred, there are no precise measurements 
for the ideal of “progress” that is the objective of intellectual 
property protection in the United States.  And certainly, in related 
issues involving property and liberty,32 or federalism, the Court’s 
deference to the institutional competency of Congress has not 
precluded an examination of the exercise of such competency 
under the constitutional provision at issue.33  The Court’s failure to 
address the meaning of the Clause purposively, or to determine 
why rational basis deference was the appropriate standard of 
review, raises directly the famous “footnote four” problem in United 
States v. Carolene Products.34  Does the enormous influence of special 
interest groups on copyright legislation and the diffuse nature of 
“the public” together add up to something akin to “legislation 
which restricts . . . political processes which can ordinarily be 
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation . . .”?35  
This is a difficult question, because copyright law historically has 
been the product of negotiation and compromise between special 
 
 32. Of course, this is part of the fundamental problem: Is copyright more 
about personal rights and less about commerce or vice versa? This is one of the 
classic dilemmas of intellectual property rights—not quite property but more than 
trade regulation.  The Slaughter-House Cases convey an early reflection of the 
intractable relationship between property, liberty, and exclusive privileges.  “But 
we think it may be safely affirmed, that the parliament of Great Britain, 
representing the people in their legislative functions, and the legislative bodies of 
this country, have from time immemorial to the present day, continued to grant to 
persons and corporations exclusive privileges—privileges denied to other 
citizens—privileges which come within any just definition of the word monopoly, 
as much as those now under consideration; and that the power to do this has 
never been questioned or denied.  Nor can it be truthfully denied that some of the 
most useful and beneficial enterprises set on foot for the general good, have been 
made successful by means of these exclusive rights, and could only have been 
conducted to success in that way.”  See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). See generally 
LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968) (examining 
copyright as a form of trade regulation). 
 33. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995).  One could argue, of course, that second-guessing Congress in 
matters of private property rights is an entirely different matter than doing so in 
matters of states’ rights and the Court has a stronger history of engaging in the 
latter. 
 34. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 35. Id. 
8
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interest groups, dominated, of course, by the interests of copyright 
owners.36  However, representatives of the “public interest,”37 such 
as librarians, educators, and scientific organizations, have recently 
played important roles in opposing the expansionist demands of 
the content industry, both domestically and internationally.38  
While the playing field is by no means even, the point is that the 
opportunity for participation in the legislative process and the 
measure of success flowing from such participation39 weaken 
arguments that copyright legislation is subject only to protectionist 
interest group influence.  Further, in light of previous term 
extensions by Congress, the CTEA does not, on its face, fall within a 
“specific prohibition of the Constitution.”40  But even if it did, it is 
unlikely that granting term extension to all authors of existing and 
future copyrights would “call for a . . . more searching judicial 
inquiry”41 as may be directed to legislation that targets specific 
 
 36. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 23, 135-63 (2001). 
 37. I am fully aware that this characterization is problematic.  After all, the 
grant of rights to authors is an inextricable aspect of the public interest. In this 
context, I am simply referring to the efforts to preserve a balanced system between 
owners and users of protected works. 
 38. J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent 
Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 793, 
824-26 (1999) (discussing the “unusual” direct participation of United States 
scientific organizations in negotiations over the proposed database bill).  See also 
Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 369, 374 nn. 
32, 33 (1997) (noting how those who had opposed the Clinton Administration 
digital agenda before Congress turned their efforts to WIPO and helped to 
influence the negotiations toward a more balanced treaty).  “They not only 
successfully lobbied the Clinton administration, persuading it to moderate or 
abandon parts of its digital agenda at WIPO, they also attended WIPO-sponsored 
regional meetings to acquaint other states with their concerns about the draft 
treaties, and went to Geneva in large numbers to participate informally in the 
diplomatic conference as observers and lobbyists. These expressions of concern 
found a receptive audience among many national delegations to the diplomatic 
conference. In the end, none of the original U.S.-sponsored digital agenda 
proposals emerged unscathed from the negotiation process, and at least one—the 
proposed database treaty—did not emerge at all.  Insofar as the copyright treaty 
emanating from the diplomatic conference contains provisions addressing digital 
agenda issues, these provisions reflect an approach that strongly resembles the 
balancing-of-interests approach that has been traditional in U.S. copyright law. 
The WIPO Copyright Treaty even affirms ‘the need to maintain a balance between 
the interests of authors and the larger public interest, particularly education, 
research and access to information.’ ”Id. at 374-75. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 
210 (2003). 
 41. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
9
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groups of people.  This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that 
it is the very operation of the political process that produced the 
CTEA,42 and some commentators have suggested that the 
outworking of this process is a reason important enough to justify 
the Court’s deference to Congress.43 
But I suspect that it was the very intractability of determining 
“welfare” and “progress” that compelled the Court to treat Eldred 
not as a case about the Copyright Clause per se,44 but merely as a 
reflection of congressional judgment that adding another layer of 
protection to an established copyright system45 was consistent with 
the public good.  Once the Court acknowledged the 
constitutionality of term extension,46 the effect of such extension 
on the copyright balance easily became a matter of judgment about 
where the appropriate lines should be drawn between owners and 
the public. The majority did not view it as the Court’s role to 
engage in such line-drawing or to second-guess Congress’s 
competency to do so.47  This is not unique to copyright. For 
example, difficulty in defining the “public use” requirement of the 
Fifth Amendment has led the Court to defer almost entirely to 
Congress on this aspect of takings law.48  Even in areas where the 
Court has actively developed a body of constitutional 
interpretation, such as “due process” or “equal protection,” 
deference to Congress is more likely as the claims at issue fall 
further away from the core issues of  procedure or discrimination 
that are the nuclei of these two areas of constitutional 
 
 42. Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright 
Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331 
(2003). 
 43. Id. at 2402. 
 44. The petitioners in Eldred did not argue that term extension itself was 
unconstitutional, but rather that serial term extension was a violation of the 
requirement that protection should exist for “limited times.” 
 45. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 210 (noting the various times Congress had 
extended the copyright term). 
 46. The Court elided the interpretation of the Clause and focused instead on 
the constitutionality of term extension per se, concluding that the CTEA was not a 
violation of the Copyright Clause.  See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209 (noting that “a 
regime of perpetual copyrights ‘clearly is not the situation before us.’ ”) 
 47. See also United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 147 (1938).  The 
Court noted that where the values of a particular legislation are debatable, the 
decision belongs to Congress alone and “neither the finding of a court arrived at 
by weighing the evidence, nor the verdict of a jury can be substituted for it.” Id. at 
154. 
 48. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
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jurisprudence.49 
Eldred was not as surprising or outrageous as it was 
disappointing.  Many may have underestimated the path-
dependency created by previous term extensions,50 and by the 
increased internationalization of copyright relations, which 
inexorably raises standards of protection worldwide. These two 
factors in themselves exert significant force in two areas of 
constitutional jurisprudence where the Court is also fairly 
deferential; namely, Congress’s authority pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause and the Executive’s exercise of the Foreign 
Affairs Power.51  This said, however, it should be noted that there 
are zones of constitutional sensitivity even in these traditional areas 
of deference.  For example, judicial sensitivity to the Copyright 
Clause is likely to be heightened significantly in instances where 
legislation implementing treaty obligations introduces new rights 
unfamiliar to, or in tension with, domestic copyright law.52  In my 
view, such cases offer a stronger basis for assessing the boundaries 
of congressional power under the Copyright Clause.53  An 
important case to watch in this regard is Golan v. Ashcroft.54 
In Golan, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the 
 
 49. I am grateful to Jim Chen for pointing this out. 
 50. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 210 (noting that previous term extensions did not 
create perpetual copyrights).  See also Luck’s Music Library Inc. v. Ashcroft, Civ. 
Action No. 01-2220, 2004 WL 1278070 (D.D.C. June 10, 2004) (affirming the 
constitutionality of copyright restoration based on previous restorations by 
Congress). 
 51. With respect to the Treaty Power, the Supreme Court held in Geofrey v. 
Riggs: “The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited 
except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of 
the government . . . and those arising from the nature of the government itself 
and the States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize 
what the Constitution forbids . . . .”  133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).  Modern Supreme 
Court jurisprudence recognizes constitutional limitations to the Treaty Power that 
apply to all exercises of federal power, but remains very broad.  See, e.g., Missouri v. 
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); see also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 185 (1996). 
 52. At the very least, legislation that destabilizes the traditional scheme of the 
copyright system is likely to give rise to a heightened standard of judicial review.  
See Eldred, 537 U.S. 186; see also Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. 
Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  But see Luck’s Music Library at 9-13 (noting that 
Congress has historically exercised its powers to restore copyright). 
 53. The district court opinion in Eldred states as much and was not disturbed 
by the Supreme Court.  If anything, the Dastar opinion in my view affirms this 
point.  See infra at 1650-52 (discussing  Dastar). 
 54. Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D.Colo. 2004). 
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CTEA and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA).55 Section 
514 of the URAA56 amended the Copyright Act by restoring 
copyright protection to qualifying works of foreign origin whose 
authors lost their United States copyrights for failure to comply 
with then-existing copyright formalities.57  Pursuant to the URAA, 
the Copyright Act was amended58 to allow restoration of copyright 
for the length of time the work would have been protected had it 
not lost its copyright status.59  The plaintiffs in Golan argued that 
copyright restoration restricts their right to free speech because 
they could no longer publish works in which copyright had been 
restored, and violates their Due Process rights under the Fifth 
Amendment by unfairly trammeling on their expectations to be 
able freely to use works already in the public domain.60  The district 
court allowed all but the term extension claim to withstand the 
government’s motion to dismiss.61  Importantly, the court held that 
the plaintiffs’ First Amendment argument was adequately 
distinguished from the one made in Eldred, thus suggesting that the 
Golan court may apply a higher standard of scrutiny to assess the 
constitutionality of § 104A of the Copyright Act.62  Although the 
court expressed some skepticism about the plaintiffs’ Due Process 
argument, it considered seriously the claim that copyright 
restoration is a violation of the Copyright Clause.  Citing the district 
court opinion in Eldred, the court noted that the Supreme Court’s 
precedent in Graham v. John Deere Co.63 would preclude Congress 
from extending copyright to a work in the public domain.64  
Interestingly, the plaintiffs in Golan employed a similar strategy 
 
 55. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 
(1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of  17 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C. 
(2000)). 
 56. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2000). 
 57. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A (h)(6)(C)(I) (2000). 
 58. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976, codified at 
17 U.S.C. § 104A (2000). 
 59. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A (a)(1)(B) (2000). 
 60. Golan, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 1220. 
 61. Id. at 1221. 
 62. Id. at 1220. 
 63. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (holding that “Congress 
may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent 
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already 
available”). 
 64. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d at 377 (2002) (observing that Graham “would 
indeed preclude Congress from authorizing under [the Patent and Copyright] 
Clause a copyright to a work already in the public domain”). 
12
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used by the government in Eldred by pointing out previous 
legislative acts, which specifically precluded the extension of 
copyright to works in the public domain.65  Coupled with the 
explicit acknowledgment in Dastar of a “federal right to copy and to 
use expired copyrights,”66 other dicta noting the “carefully crafted 
bargain” between authors and the public,67 and statements averring 
to the limits of authorial/inventor prerogatives, I believe Golan 
offers an opportunity to contest the precedential weight of 
copyright expansionism with the strong legacy of preserving a 
robust public domain. 
An additional factor to consider is a little-acknowledged 
footnote in the first international agreement negotiated by the 
United States allowing restoration of foreign works in the public 
domain.  Under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA),68 qualifying motion pictures of Mexican and Canadian 
authors can be restored.69 However, the treaty also notes that such 
restoration would only proceed if it was not deemed to be 
unconstitutional.70  It would appear, then, that the government 
itself was initially uncertain as to the constitutionality of copyright 
restoration.  When restoration was not challenged under NAFTA, 
Congress dipped the proverbial “entire legislative foot” by 
expanding restoration to all copyrightable works of eligible foreign 
authors.71 Given this background of the modern copyright 
restoration impetus, I am far from confident that the fairly limited 
history of copyright restoration to domestic authors presumptively 
confers a constitutional legitimacy on copyright restoration to 
foreign authors.  The fact that such discriminatory restoration is 
based on an exercise of the Treaty Power makes the restoration 
regime more—not less—constitutionally suspect, and certainly calls 
for a higher level of judicial scrutiny.72 
 
 65. Golan, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 1219. 
 66. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 
(2003). 
 67. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33-34. 
 68. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Annex 1705.7, 32 
I.L.M. 289, 605 (1993) available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/ 
legal/index_e.aspx?articleid=170#An1705.7 (last visited July 20, 2004). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (stating “This obligation shall apply to the extent that it is consistent 
with the Constitution of the United States . . . .”). 
 71. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, tit. 5, § 514, 108 
Stat. 4809 (1994). 
 72. Cf. Luck’s Music Library Inc. v. Ashcroft, Civ. Action No. 01-2220, 2004 
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At least one district court has confronted, without answering, 
the question of whether the United States can constitutionally 
obligate itself to a treaty that requires enforcement of  a copyright 
that falls short of the requirements for copyrightability established 
by the Copyright Clause.73  This question, along with another 
equally difficult issue—whether Congress can accomplish under 
the Commerce Clause what is forbidden by the Copyright Clause—
has not been directly addressed by the Supreme Court.74 The 
weight of the Court’s acknowledgment of the public domain in 
Dastar, the importance of historical practice emphasized in Eldred, 
and the culture of strict interpretation that is evident in Tasini all 
suggest that the constitutional challenge in Golan is more likely to 
meaningfully address the constitutional questions that many hoped 
Eldred would answer. 
The Supreme Court’s deference is a striking feature of this 
new millennium. It was, after all, the Court that almost single-
handedly created the doctrinal underlay of the “public domain.”  
The most salient tributaries to the public domain are the result of 
the Court’s active policing of congressional power, and its careful 
interpretation of the Copyright Act in light of the constitutional 
mandate of the Copyright Clause.  In the landmark decision of 
Baker v. Selden,75 the Supreme Court drew the distinction between 
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable ideas.  The 
idea/expression dichotomy today is one of the key doctrines 
contributing to the public domain,76 and is codified in § 102(b) of 
 
WL 1278070 (D.D.C. June 10, 2004). 
 73. Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).   
 74. The weight of scholarly opinion is that the Copyright Clause imposes 
limits on the exercise of congressional authority pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause.  See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection 
Legislation: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in 
Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 539-52 (2000); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna 
Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause As an 
Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL L. REV. 1119 (2000); William Patry, The 
Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional 
Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359 (1999).  In United States v. Moghadam, the court 
held that protecting unfixed performances pursuant to the Commerce Clause is 
not “fundamentally inconsistent” with the fixation requirement in the Copyright 
Clause, but might violate the “limited times” provision.  175 F. 3d 1269 (11th Cir. 
1999).  The court ultimately did not consider this issue because it had not been 
raised by the plaintiff during the district court proceedings. 
 75. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
 76. Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 79, 83-
84 (1989) (explaining importance of idea/expression dichotomy in keeping a 
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the Copyright Act.  Pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement,77 the 
idea/expression dichotomy is now also a principle of international 
copyright law.78 Other limitations on the rights of owners, such as 
the first sale doctrine, have antecedents in some of the earliest 
decisions of the Court.79  Like the idea/expression dichotomy, the 
first sale doctrine has also been codified in the Copyright Act.80 
The lower courts in the nineteenth century also played a 
significant role in guarding the boundaries of the Copyright 
Clause.81  For example, in Clayton v. Stone & Hall,82 the court denied 
the copyrightability of a daily publication of current market 
prices.83 The court looked first at the Copyright Clause to 
determine what was protectable and held that, since the statute in 
question was passed pursuant to this constitutional imperative, 
copyright protection had to be consistent with the promotion of 
science and the useful arts.84 Similarly, the District Court in Burrow-
Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony85 took very seriously the limitations 
imposed by the Constitution to hold that Congress did not have the 
constitutional right to protect photographs by copyright.86 
Although this rigid interpretation might be an example of the 
inflexibility that Professor Leaffer eschews,87 the Supreme Court’s 
decision in the case was nevertheless soundly literalist in its 
interpretation of the constitutional clause.88  This same literalism is 
 
store of “raw materials” in public domain). 
 77. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement]. 
 78. See TRIPS Agreement, art. 9 (2), supra note 77. 
 79. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908) (“Recent cases in 
this Court have affirmed the proposition that copyright protection under the 
Federal law . . . depends upon the right created under the acts of Congress passed 
in pursuance of the authority conferred under . . . the Federal Constitution . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
 80. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000). 
 81. See, e.g., Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872). 
 82. Clayton, 5 F. Cas. 999 . 
 83. Id. at 1003. 
 84. According to the court, “it would certainly be a pretty extraordinary view 
of the sciences to consider a daily or weekly publication of the state of the market 
as falling within any class of them . . . . The act of Congress is ‘for the 
encouragement of learning,’ and was not intended for the encouragement of 
mere industry, unconnected with learning and the sciences . . . .” Id. 
 85. Sarony v. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 17 F. 591 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883). 
 86. Id. at 592. 
 87. Leaffer, supra note 21, at 1598. 
 88. See Burrow Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884). 
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evident in the Court’s resoluteness about digital technology in 
Tasini. Indeed, the Court’s literalism in Tasini is remarkably 
consistent with the Court’s treatment of new technology in White-
Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.89 There, the Court held that a 
player piano roll was not a “copy” of the musical composition it 
represented. Congress responded to this decision by legislative 
change in the 1909 Copyright Act.90 
Outside of the technology context, nineteenth and early 
twentieth century judicial interpretations were quite literal, often 
drawing on historicism to constrain the operation of the Copyright 
Act, particularly with respect to the basic right to copy.91  In Ricordi 
and Co. v. Mason,92 the court construed § 1 of the 1909 Copyright 
Act and held that a booklet that described various opera scenes was 
not an infringement of copyrights in the underlying librettos.  
According to the court, stories of the defendant were neither 
abridgements nor infringements on plaintiff’s copyright because 
they did not interfere with the right to “publish, reproduce or sell 
the operas.”  The alleged infringing stories, according to the court, 
gave “just enough information to put the reader upon inquiry, 
precisely as the syllabus of a law report, the review of a book, or the 
description of a painting induces the reader to examine further.”93  
The defendant was simply making use of the copyrighted material; 
copyright protection, the court held, does not extend so far as to 
prevent this use.94  Similarly, the mechanical reproduction of 
sounds of a performance of copyrighted music was not considered 
an infringement of the copyright in the composition.95 On the 
other hand, lithographic reproductions of copyrighted works were 
held to constitute infringements of the underlying works.96 Between 
 
 89. White-Smith Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
 90. Subjecting mechanical reproductions of musical works to a compulsory 
licensing system.  See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. 
 91. See, e.g., Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562 (C.A. D.C. 1901) (holding that 
mechanical reproductions of sounds of a performance of copyrighted music were 
not an infringement of the copyright in the composition); Ricordi & Co. v. Mason, 
201 Fed. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (construing § 1 of the 1909 Copyright Act to allow 
descriptions of various opera scenes of the plaintiff’s works because the 
descriptions were not abridgements, and did not interfere with the exclusive right 
to publish, reproduce, or sell the operas). 
 92. Ricordi, 201 F. 182. 
 93. Id. at 183. 
 94. Id. at 185. 
 95. Stern, 17 App. D.C. 562. 
 96. Schumacher v. Schwencke, 25 F. 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1885). 
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1856 and 1870, new laws granted performance rights to musical 
and dramatic works;97 and protected photographs or negatives,98 
dramatic compositions, painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, 
and models or designs intended to be perfected as works of fine 
art.99  Translation rights and the right to dramatize novels were also 
included in the corpus of copyright protection.100  At one time or 
another, all of these activities had previously been determined by a 
court to be noninfringing activity, most usually because the works 
did not infringe a specific right. 
The literalism that characterized the nineteenth century 
copyright cases evidenced vigilant attempts to reinforce the 
statutory roots of the new copyright, all while ensuring that 
Congress’s exercise of power was consistent with the Copyright 
Clause. The scope of congressional power and the means of 
exercising that power were distinct in the eyes of the judiciary, and 
deference to the means chosen by Congress was the result of 
satisfaction with the constitutionality of the legislation. In this 
sense, Eldred was inconsistent with the Court’s historical approach 
to the Copyright Clause.101 The nineteenth century courts were 
literal precisely so they could affirm that copyright protection was a 
product solely of statutes, and had no claim outside of the welfare-
enhancing objectives established by the Constitution and 
implemented by Congress.  The modern literalism goes in the 
opposite direction, affirming Congress’s power no matter how or if 
remotely related to the objectives and ideals of the Clause’s 
purpose. 
II. SHIFTING BOUNDARIES: CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER THE 
COPYRIGHT CLAUSE AND THE TREATY POWER 
Scholars and commentators have criticized the Dastar opinion 
for undermining an already weak compliance scheme for the 
 
 97. The Copyright Revision Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831) (music); 
Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (1856) (drama). 
 98. Act of March 3, 1865, § 1, 13 Stat. 540 (1865). 
 99. Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212 (1870). 
 100. Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (1870). 
 101. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 291 
(1907); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903); 
Higgens v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 430-31, 433 (1891); Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 
U.S. 123, 151 (1889); Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); Wheaton v. 
Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 642 (1834). 
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protection of moral rights under the Berne Convention.102 At the 
time of Berne accession, the Berne Convention Implementation 
Act (BCIA) stated that existing United States law, such as “various 
provisions of the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act, various state 
statutes, and common law principles[,]”103 was sufficient to protect 
moral rights. The Court in Dastar declined to find a right of 
attribution under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act for works in the 
public domain reproduced by others.  Writing for a unanimous 
Court, Justice Scalia stated that to find such a right of attribution 
would create a series of “mutant copyright laws” that would 
trammel on the “federal right to copy and use expired 
copyrights.”104  This explicit reference to a positive right to freely 
access and use public domain works is an important 
acknowledgment by the Court of the centrality of the public 
domain to the copyright system.  Ironically, the Court further 
noted that extending § 43(a) to works in the public domain 
renders limitations on copyright (in visual and other kinds of 
works) superfluous.105  Although Congress enacted a very limited 
version of moral rights protection after ratification of the Berne 
Convention,106 the Court deferred to Congress’s  ambivalence to 
moral rights by observing that  “[w]hen Congress has wished to 
create such an addition to the law of copyright, it has done so with 
much more specificity than the Lanham Act’s ambiguous use of 
‘origin.’ ”107  In reviewing the right of attribution granted under the 
 
 102. Tyler T. Ochoa, Amicus Brief, Introduction: Rights of Attribution, Section 
43(A) of the Lanham Act, and the Copyright Public Domain,  24 WHITTIER L. REV. 911 
(2003) (questioning how Dastar can be reconciled with moral rights under the 
Berne Convention); Janet Fries & Michael J. Remington, Beware of Mutant 
Copyright: Justice Scalia Issues a Warning in the Dastar Decision, IP LAW & BUSINESS, 
Sept. 2003, at 70 (questioning whether Dastar leaves United States law in 
compliance with the Berne Convention); Leaffer, supra note 21, at 1615 (asserting 
that “Dastar goes far in undermining whatever illusion is left of the minimalist” 
position on moral rights in the United States). 
 103. See Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2(3), 
102 Stat. 2853 (1988), codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2000). 
 104. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003) 
(citing Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989)). 
 105. Id.  at 35. 
 106. See Visual Artists Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 5089, 
5128-33 (1990) (hereinafter VARA) (granting the author of a work of visual art the 
right of attribution; the right to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation or 
other modification of the work prejudicial to the author’s reputation; and the 
right to prevent destruction of works of art of a recognized stature), codified in 17 
U.S.C. § 106A (2000). 
 107. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34-35. 
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Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA),108 the Court was very clearly aware 
of the obligations under the Berne Convention.109  In ignoring 
those obligations, the Court reinforced Congress’s attitude by 
narrowly interpreting the word “origin.” 
The fairly loud scholarly “buzz” about the implications of 
Dastar for United States compliance with the Berne Convention 
ignores the important fact that the TRIPS Agreement specifically 
excludes any obligation to protect moral rights.110  The United 
States insisted on this exclusion during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations because it remained unwilling to commit to a strong 
regime for the protection of moral rights.111  Thus, the Dastar 
decision, as much as it compromises the protection of moral rights 
in the United States, is not subject to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) dispute-settlement process.112  Further, under 
principles of international law, the TRIPS Agreement supersedes 
the Berne Convention.113  At best, it is an open question whether, as 
 
 108. VARA, supra note 106. 
 109. VARA was enacted pursuant to United States accession to the Berne 
Convention.  VARA provides limited moral rights protection for works of visual 
arts.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000). 
 110. TRIPS Agreement, art. 9, supra note 77. 
 111. Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims under the TRIPS 
Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 357, 
379 n.92 (1998). 
 112. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994). 
 113. The more specific agreement prevails in interpretive conflicts between 
two treaties.  See Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: 
Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” Test, 32 INT’L LAW 619, 644 (1998).  For some 
support for the proposition that TRIPS supersedes Berne to some extent, see Sam 
Ricketson, Copyright and Related Rights in the TRIPS Agreement, available at 
http://www.kipo.go.kr/ehtml/eAnnSemi05.html (last visited July 20, 2004); Susan 
M. Deas, Jazzing Up the Copyright Act? Resolving the Uncertainties of the United States 
Anti-Bootlegging Law,  20 HASTINGS COMM & ENT L.J. 567 (1998) (“Although TRIPs 
member nations are required to comply with the Berne Convention requirements, 
this requirement is subject to TRIPs ‘signal exception,’ which explicitly states that 
Berne Article 6bis moral rights or obligations are excluded from TRIPs’ mandatory 
incorporation of Berne Convention provisions.” [citing NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]); 
contra, Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International 
Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 768 (2001) (“In the 
area of copyright, the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement form the 
overall framework for multilateral protection. Most WTO Members are also parties 
to the Berne Convention . . . .  [I]t is a general principle of interpretation to adopt 
the meaning that reconciles the texts of different treaties and avoids a conflict 
between them. Accordingly, one should avoid interpreting the TRIPS Agreement 
to mean something different than the Berne Convention except where this is 
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between two WTO member states, the United States has an 
obligation to protect moral rights.  However, as between a WTO 
member and a non-WTO member who have both ratified the 
Berne Convention, the Article 6bis obligation still applies with full 
force. 
An important limit to this argument is that Article 2(2) of the 
TRIPS Agreement preserves the obligations members have to each 
other under existing intellectual property agreements, including 
the Berne Convention.  From an international law perspective, the 
picture that emerges is as follows: countries that never joined the 
Berne Convention have no obligation to protect moral rights under 
the TRIPS Agreement, and countries that are members of the 
WTO and the Berne Convention cannot employ the compliance 
mechanism of the WTO to enforce a member’s obligation to 
protect moral rights under the Berne Convention.  Finally, since 
the domestic application of an international treaty is governed 
solely by the provisions of the implementing legislation, protection 
of moral rights in the United States is available only to the extent 
that Congress has enacted legislation for such protection.114  The 
Court in Dastar clearly was aware of the passage of VARA as 
Congress’s effort to provide a limited form of moral rights 
protection.  This suggests that the Court (rightly) was unwilling to 
treat the Lanham Act and the Copyright Act as coterminous, nor 
 
explicitly provided for. This principle is in conformity with the public 
international law presumption against conflicts, which has been applied by WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body in a number of cases.”); Martin D.H. Woodward, 
Comment, TRIPS and NAFTA’s Chapter 17: How Will Trade-Related Multilateral 
Agreements Affect International Copyright?, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 269, 275 (1996) (“The 
Berne Convention, then, continues to be of great significance in both TRIPS and 
NAFTA; while both agreements exhibit some degree of independence from the 
Berne Convention, the paradigms of international copyright protection 
established by the Convention remain influential.”)  In several significant respects, 
the TRIPS Agreement now outflanks and supersedes the provisions of the Berne 
Convention. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 59, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 345-46, 8 I.L.M. 679, 700-01 (specifying circumstances under 
which newer treaty supersedes older treaty on same subject matter). 
 114. See  § 3(a) of the BCIA: “The Berne Convention (1) shall be given effect 
under title 17, as amended by this Act, and any other relevant provision of Federal 
or State law, including the common law and, (2) shall not be enforceable in any 
action brought pursuant to the provisions of the Berne Convention itself.”  Section 
4(c) goes on to provide in part that “no right or interest in a work eligible for 
protection under this title may be claimed by virtue of, or in reliance upon, the 
provisions of the Berne Convention or the adherence of the United States 
thereto.”  Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 
102 Stat. 2853 (1988). 
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(wrongly) to explicitly consider the exercise of the Treaty Power as 
an additional basis to engage in judicial oversight of Congress’s 
competency.115 
III. MORE THAN A JURISPRUDENCE OF DEFERENCE? 
The Court’s deference at this particular historical moment is 
troublesome from another perspective.  Copyright legislation is 
well known to be a product of interest-group bargaining that 
invariably diminishes the voice of a diffuse and loosely organized 
public.  This public choice problem is being addressed in a variety 
of ways,116 particularly through the activities of public interest 
groups who seek to counterbalance the influence of the 
entertainment industry.  Notwithstanding, the legislative process 
remains quite vulnerable to pervasive, persistent and economically 
powerful organized industries that generally represent copyright 
owners’ interests.  As other commentators have observed, the 
Court’s deference ultimately leads to acquiescence to the extension 
of the underlying economic philosophy of the Industrial Age to the 
Information Age, namely that strong property interests are an 
indispensable feature of a “rapidly changing civilization.”117  This 
suggests not pragmatic instrumentalism, but the Court’s own 
acceptance of a core normative vision of copyright law.  It is a vision 
more about what exclusive proprietary rights mean to the national 
economy than what they mean to authors or the public. That vision 
must be carefully considered in the combined light of the 
Copyright Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Treaty Power.  
 
 115. The Court’s rigid adherence in Dastar to the boundaries between 
copyright, patent, and trademark is also consistent with the weight of precedent 
going back to the nineteenth century.  See, e.g., Higgens v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428 
(1891); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 642 
(1834). 
 116. Dennis S. Karjala, Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension Legislation, 36 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 199, 245-46 (2002) ( “Especially where special interests have 
managed to convince Congress to pass legislation that is directly contrary to the 
express constitutional purpose, some independent review of the basis for the 
legislation is imperative.”); Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright Duration Extension and the 
Dark Heart of Copyright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655, 659 (1996) (“The 
marketing and concomitant lobbying power of the copyright industries, and their 
repeated victories at the expense of individual authors (most particularly in the 
work-made-for-hire context) is a clarion call to the Court to read the Copyright 
Clause with fresh attention and historical understanding.”). 
 117. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 263 (1918); Julie E. 
Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 
MICH. L. REV. 462 (1988); see also Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 42. 
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Within the context of the latter, this vision informs global trade 
relations and exacerbates the pressure on the domestic legislative 
process.  For this reason, I have suggested elsewhere that 
mandatory adjudication panels under the auspices of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) must take seriously the balance 
between owners and users of public goods.118  Specifically, these 
panels must develop a jurisprudence of public welfare that will 
affirm the importance of the public interest in reasonable access to 
protected works, and that can influence domestic policies in favor 
of a balanced approach to copyright.119  At the very least, the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism should not contribute to domestic 
welfare- distorting applications of the TRIPS Agreement, and 
should account for correction of domestic government failure.120  
This outcome is compelled, at least in part, by modern trends in 
international law and is facilitative of the welfare goals of 
international economic policy.121  It is also consistent with the 
internal constraints of constitutional democracy on the 
international legal process, and might help to constrain the global 
influence that promotes a one-sided version of “progress” and the 
“public good.” 
It is not just the public interest that is at stake given the 
Supreme Court’s repose in the copyright arena. Rather, the Court’s 
role in copyright cases also speaks to the balance between 
Congress’s authority over domestic copyright matters, and the 
Executive’s exercise of the Treaty Power to negotiate bilateral and 
multilateral copyright agreements that may coexist uneasily with 
established copyright doctrines.122 Given the global pressures that 
influence domestic copyright legislation,123 pressures that the Court 
 
 118. See Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS 
Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819 (2003). 
 119. Id. at 824. 
 120. Id. at 838, 913-17. 
 121. Expressing those goals, the IMF Articles of Agreement’s Article 1, 
Purpose, includes “(ii)To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of 
international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance 
of high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the 
productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy.” 
IMF Articles of Agreement, art. 1, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ 
ft/ aa/aa01.htm (last visited July 20, 2004). 
 122. See Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 75 (2000) (arguing that the fair use doctrine is in tension with the 
Berne three-step test and advocating for an explicit fair use principle in 
international copyright law). 
 123. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts 
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alluded to in both Eldred and Dastar, I do not agree that the search 
for permanent principles of constitutional probity will lead 
inexorably to inflexible or unworkable outcomes for copyright 
law.124  Indeed, I suggest that if the Constitution admits sweeping 
congressional powers over copyright with minimal constraints, the 
exercise of the Treaty Power in the area of copyright and patent law 
is of significant concern. In Reid v. Covert,125 a plurality of the Court 
held that the Treaty Power cannot be used to avoid the 
Constitution’s affirmative limitation on congressional power—in 
that case, the Bill of Rights.126  Thus, the Treaty Power could not be 
used to deprive a U.S. citizen of the right to a court trial.  However, 
in the related case of Missouri v. Holland,127 the Court adverted that 
the Treaty Power may be used to accomplish things that are not 
otherwise within the power of Congress.  If the promotion of 
progress and the useful arts is not a limit on Congress’s power, then 
Holland would govern and international agreements become a 
more powerful agency of legislative change in the domestic arena.  
Of course, Congress could, as it often does, limit the reach of an 
agreement through the use of implementing legislation, which 
then constitutes the only source of the treaty’s domestic 
application.128  Where, however, the root issue is Congress’s capture 
 
Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 477 (2000) (“[a]lmost every 
significant reform of U.S. copyright law over the last twelve years, since the United 
States belatedly joined the Berne Convention in 1988, has reflected international 
influences” ); Graeme W. Austin, Does the Copyright Clause Mandate Isolationism?, 26 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 17, 39 (2002) (noting that “significant aspects of U.S. copyright 
law are influenced by international concerns, and important parts are dictated by 
a growing body of public international law obligations”). 
 124. Leaffer, supra note 21, at 1598. 
 125. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 126. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X. 
 127. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). 
 128. See, e.g., Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 
195 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that the scope of United States protection under the 
Berne Convention is defined by United States legislation: “Thus, while the 
Copyright Act, as amended by the BCIA, extends certain protection to the holders 
of copyright in Berne Convention works as there defined, the Copyright Act is the 
exclusive source of that protection.”  The Berne Convention Implementation Act 
states that: 
[T]he provisions of the Berne Convention— 
(1) shall be given effect under title 17, as amended by this Act, 
and any other relevant provision of Federal or State law, including 
the common law, and 
(2) shall not be enforceable in any action brought pursuant to the 
provisions of the Berne Convention itself. 
Pub. L. 100-568, § 3, 102 Stat. 2853, 2853 (1988). 
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by special-interest groups, whose influence has proven just as 
powerful in the international arena,129 implementing legislation in 
fact becomes another opportunity to secure or expand the gains 
made internationally, or to weaken or eliminate any public-interest 
limitations admitted by the treaty.130  This was clearly the case with 
respect to the World Intellectual Property Organization’s 
Copyright Treaty,131 which was implemented very narrowly through 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.132  The question of how the 
Treaty Power may expand indirectly the Copyright Power is 
squarely at issue in Golan.  If the Court determines that the object 
of the Copyright Clause is a limitation on Congress’s power, then 
under the rule in Reid, the scope of congressional power will yet 
again be addressed by a lower court. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Copyright law recently has taken a place alongside the First 
Amendment and Due Process as an area of significant 
constitutional importance.  Of course, copyright touches both of 
these areas and more. The ubiquitousness of copyright in modern 
American culture has occasioned an unprecedented economic 
influence exerted by the entertainment industry over the legislative 
branch, creating a movement of global proportion to limit the 
expansion of copyright.  In the United States, the explicit 
constitutionalization of intellectual property matters has focused 
primarily on the nexus between copyright and the First 
 
Similarly, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act specifies that U.S. law shall prevail 
in the event of any conflict with the Uruguay Round Agreements.  Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465,  § 102, 108 Stat. 4809, 4815 (1994). 
 129. Okediji, supra note 118 (analyzing the TRIPS Agreement negotiations 
using game theory, and arguing that the WTO dispute-settlement process should 
defer to a country’s calculus of public welfare except in cases where the 
international forum is used as an excuse to avoid consideration of the public 
interest at the domestic level). 
 130. See Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property: 
Narratives of Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 
SING. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 315, 374-75 (2003/2004) (suggesting that developing 
countries adopt a practice of implementing legislation to strengthen the prospects 
that development concerns will be considered in deciding how the treaty will be 
incorporated in domestic law). 
 131. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997). 
 132. For analysis of the WIPO negotiations and the success of the coalition of 
public interest groups and developing countries that opposed the expansionist 
digital agenda, see Samuelson, supra note 38. 
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Amendment.133  However, the recent emphasis on constitutional 
concerns has been a central part of efforts to insulate traditional 
copyright rights (and for that matter intellectual property 
generally) from the rapid encroachment of greater propertization. 
This movement has not always been accompanied by careful 
examination of the ways in which the appeal to constitutional 
jurisprudence in any number of areas might actually affect or 
influence the Court’s examination of intellectual property policy, 
nor of how they should.  With the explicit politicization of 
copyright policy through interest-group activity, the role of the 
Supreme Court is now a significant aspect of the public choice 
problem facing advocates of the public domain.  But it is also a cry 
for the Court to once again assume a dynamic deference, 
reminiscent of its brief period in the nineteenth century, which is 
faithful to congressional intent without abandoning constitutional 
interpretation.  In the words of Justice Holmes, “[a] 
Constitution . . . is made for people of fundamentally differing 
views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and 
familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our 
judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them 
conflict with the Constitution of the United States.”134 
 
 
 133. See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional 
Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979); Paul Goldstein, 
Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 1011-15, 1017-22 (1970); 
Neil W. Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
1 (2001); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 134. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905). 
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